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I 
The central bulk of Nelson Goodman's influential 
Languages of Art is devoted to the problem of the iden-
tity of th"e work of art.(l] In chapter three Goodman 
first expounds his now famous distinction between auto-
graphic and allographic art. Works of autographic arts 
(e.g., painting^ sculpture, printmaking) are works 
whose exact duplication cannot guarantee authenticity, 
since their authenticity depends on having the 
requisite history of production (e.g., being painted by 
the requisite artist or printed from the requisite 
plate). In such arts, "the distinction between 
original and forgery of it is significant".[2] In 
contrast, the identity and authenticity of works of al-
lographic arts (e.g., music, literature, and drama) are 
defined not historically but notationally. The work's 
essential or constitutive properties are fully deter-
mined by a notation (score, text, or script), and 
authentic instances of the work can be produced at will 
through duplication of the notation or what it 
prescribes. 
After a detailed study of the syntactic and seman-
tic requirements for notation (in chapter four), 
Goodman proceeds (in the penultimate chapter five) to 
provide notational definitions of the identity of works 
of allographic art and to explain why work-identity in 
the autographic arts must be differently defined. 
Altogether, this amounts to probably the most rigorous 
and comprehensive theory of the work of art's identity 
that has ever been presented, and not surprisingly it 
has been widely studied and discussed. 
However, Goodman's theory of work-identity has been 
severely criticized.[3] The sharp distinction between 
autographic and allographic art has sometimes been 
questioned, but probably most criticism has been 
directed at his rigidly precise notational definitions 
of the identity of allographic works, definitions which 
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seem harshly inconsistent with common sense and or-
dinary critical practice. In this paper I shall not go 
into these familiar lines of criticism, though I should 
at least note in passing that the latter has considera-
ble merit and power. My purpose here is rather to sug-
gest an altogether different sort of problem and to 
criticize Goodman's theory of work-identity not for er-
rors it has committed but for a troubling omission. I 
shall maintain that Goodman's theory suffers from the 
omission of a nominalistic formulation of his def-
initions of work-identity. This omission has serious 
ramifications, since it leaves such important issues as 
the work of art's ontological status and the relation-
ship of an authentic instance of the work to the work 
itself uncomfortably unanswered. Moreover, anyone 
familiar with Goodman's radical and passionate 
nominalism cannot help but feel uneasy with the ex-
ceedingly platonistic definitions of the works of the 
various arts that he proposes in Languages of Art. Let 
us first consider these definitions. 
II 
Goodman recognizes that in most arts (not only the 
allographic arts but even the autographic arts of 
printmaking and cast sculpture) the work of art has or 
at least can have a multiple identity. In other words, 
in most cases the work admits of more than one authen-
tic instance; more than one object or event (perform-
ance) can be an authentic example of one and the same 
work of art. What, then, is the work itself which ad-
mits of many authentic instances? 
Goodman's surprising answer is that the work of art 
itself is simply the class of authentic instances of 
the work. Regarding the autographic arts, Goodman as-
serts that "in the case of painting, a work is ... 
identified with (the unit class of) an individual 
picture; and in the case of etching, with the class of 
impressions printed from an individual plate."[4] In 
the allographic art of "music, the work is the class of 
performances compliant with a character",[5] i.e., the 
fully notational part of the score. In literary art, 
the work is the class of instances of the text, whether 
these instances be inscriptions or utterances. "In 
literature, the work is the character itself",[6] and 
Goodman has told us that "characters are certain 
classes of utterances or inscriptions or marks".[7] 
"In the drama, as in music, the work is a compliance-
class of performances."[8] Finally, in the arts of ar-
chitecture and dance, whose allographic status is 
somewhat problematic, the definitions of work-identity 
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that Goodman contemplates are also in terms of 
compliance-classes of the characters of a notation. 
In short, Goodman defines and identifies the work 
of art as a class. Even the unique, singular work of 
painting is described as a "unit class". Defining the 
work of art as a class may seem innocent enough; but 
when this is done by a radical nominalist like Goodman, 
who denies the existence of classes, properties, and 
universals of any sort, it seems like criminal 
platonism.[9] Goodman's nominalism will recognize no 
entities other than individuals, and in Languages of 
Art he condemns talk of properties as "shameless 
platonism", "pampering prejudice", and "pussy-foot-
ing". [10] Goodman's other writings reveal that his 
nominalism is just as intolerant with respect to 
classes: "Nominalism for me consists specifically in 
the refusal to recognize classes."[11] Thus, for 
Goodman, talk of classes is "informal parlance admissi-
ble only because it can readily be translated into a 
more acceptable language",[12] viz., a nominalistic 
one. However, in Languages of Art Goodman offers no 
such translation of his platonistic definitions of the 
works of the various arts; and without a nominalistic 
formulation of these definitions his theory seems pain-
fully incomplete. How indeed is it to be completed? 
Since Goodman has never provided a nominalistic trans-
lation of his definitions, we must now warily attempt 
to project one that would be acceptable to him and 
adequate for aesthetic theory. 
Ill 
Several philosophers of art have employed Pierce's 
distinction between type and token to explain the mul-
tiple identity of the work of art and the relationship 
of the authentic instances of the work to each other 
and to the work itself.[13] This distinction enables 
us to preserve the oneness of the work of art (as an 
individual type), while at the same time allowing it 
its multiplicity, its many instances (tokens). We can 
identify the individual work of art as a type which is 
exemplified by its many different tokens or instances. 
Thus, for example, we may speak of Hamlet as a single 
work (type) and yet also speak of many different per-
formances and texts as being Hamlet (tokens) without 
involving ourselves in contradiction. For though there 
are many different Hamlet-tokens there still may be 
only one Hamlet-type. 
I doubt very much that Goodman would avail himself 
of this distinction and solution, for at least with 
respect to linguistic characters he explicitly rejects 
it, preferring to "dismiss the type altogether and 
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treat the so-called tokens of a type as replicas of one 
another".114] His chief reason for rejecting the type 
is, I suppose, that types are usually considered to be 
universals or classes, and Goodman simply cannot 
tolerate such entities. However, E. M. Zemach and, 
more recently, J. Margolis have suggested that types 
may be regarded as individuals or particulars.[15] 
This ontological view could rescue Goodman's theory 
from platonism; for instead of being a platonistic 
class of performances, prints, etc., the work of art 
would be a nominalistic type-individual exemplified by 
its instances or tokens. Yet the ontology of type-
individuals seems intuitively unconvincing, and, as 
Zemach admits, it often clashes with our established 
ontological views of the individual as an object or 
event.[16] 
Another nominalistic device available to Goodman is 
to treat the name of the work of art, e.g., 'Hamlet', 
not as a proper name denoting a single individual but 
rather as a term with multiple denotation. There is 
not one individual denoted by the name 'Hamlet' but 
many individuals. Thus, there is, in a sense, not one 
work of art, Hamlet, but many works of art or more sim-
ply many aesthetic objects and events which are 
labelled or denoted by the name 'Hamlet'. By this 
nominalistic view, the statement 'This is an authentic 
instance of Hamlet' should be translated as 'The label 
"Hamlet" can be correctly applied to this object or 
event', or alternatively as 'This object or event com-
plies with the term "Hamlet"• Similarly, the statement 
'Shakespeare is the author of Hamlet' could be trans-
lated into something like 'Shakespeare is the author of 
the first object/event properly labelled "Hamlet"'• 
Finally, statements like 'Hamlet is a tragic work' 
might be translated into statements like 'Those 
objects/events which most deserve to be labelled 
"Hamlet" are tragic' or 'If x is an object/event which 
is paradigmatic for the application of "Hamlet", then x 
is exceedingly likely to be (or must be) tragic'. 
Thus, according to this brand of nominalism, 
'Hamlet' does not name a unique, individual entity, be 
it a class or type, which is exemplified at different 
times and different places by the many different per-
formances and texts which we recognize as instances of 
Hamlet. Instead 'Hamlet' is seen as a label or 
predicate which fits many aesthetic objects and events. 
Therefore, in a sense, the work of art, Hamlet, does 
not really exist, but in its place remain the many 
artistic products—texts, performances, records, films 
—which are correctly labelled 'Hamlet'. A performance 
of Hamlet or a text of Hamlet is thus not a performance 
or a text of something (e.g., a type or class) existing 
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above and beyond the performance or text; and therefore 
the nominalist might prefer to speak more perspicuously 
here of Hamlet-performances and Hamlet-texts instead of 
performances and texts of Hamlet. 
This nominalistic view of the work of art, though 
eminently frugal, seems remote from the spirit of 
Goodman's theory of work-identity with its extended ef-
fort to supply a 'real definition' of the individual 
allographic work of art that is exemplified in its many 
authentic instances. Surely in undertaking such a 
labour, Goodman seems to believe that some such 
individual—the work—exists to be defined. Nor is 
there any hint in Languages of Art that there exists no 
such entity as Hamlet that is exemplified by its 
authentic instances, and that instead there are merely 
Hamlet-instances exemplifying the label 'Hamlet'. 
Thus, it seems unlikely that Goodman would accept this 
nominalistic view of the work of art, where the work 
dissolves into a range of instances with a common 
label. 
IV 
If he rejects the type theory and the label or 
predicate theory, what then would be Goodman's 
nominalistic explanation of the work of art? Most 
likely he would explain the work of art as a superin-
dividual composed of the sum of all its actual 
instances. Max Black remarks that in Goodman's 
nominalism "it is ... admissible to conceive of the 
word 'red', say, as the superindividual composed of the 
sum of all its actual occurences or 'inscrip-
tions'. "[17] This suggests a similar treatment of the 
work of art, particularly the literary work of art, 
which is itself, like 'red', a linguistic character. 
However, this view that the work of art is the 
superindividual composed of the sum of all its actual 
instances is a view which presents some puzzling 
problems. For by this view, each unabridged copy of 
Paradise Lost is but a fraction of the work, Paradise 
Lost, which is the sum total of all the copies and ut-
terances of this work. Thus, one could probably never 
read the entire work, for indeed the work grows longer 
and longer with every copy printed. Similarly, in 
music, a complete performance of a genuine score of 
Beethoven's Eroica would be but a minute fraction of 
this work, if the work were identified with the sum of 
all such actual authentic performances. Here too the 
work would grow with every performance, and we would 
seem unable to hear the entire work. But surely we 
should not alter our conceptions of hearing a symphony 
and reading a poem just to conform to this new-fangled 
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ontology of art. Goodman might argue that these objec-
tionable consequences come only from playing with words 
and intentionally ignoring that hearing a (complete) 
symphony or reading a (complete) poem are elliptical 
for hearing a (complete) performance or reading a 
(complete) copy of the given work. However, many aes-
theticians would assert that the ellipsis is justified 
and significant, the point being that in confronting a 
complete performance or copy of a work we can also con-
front and experience the entire work itself, because 
the work itself can be said to be in a particular 
instance. For this reason it is often argued that the 
work of art is a type or universal, rather than a mere 
class or superindividual whose relation to its con-
stituent elements is not so intimate or intrinsic.[18] 
Moreover, one cannot help wonder how the various 
instances of the work are combined to create the 
superindividual and whether this superindividual is 
anything like what we mean by a work of art. Goodman 
asserts that "where two works are performed in 
succession, the resultant event, though it contains 
performances of each of the two, is itself a perform-
ance of neither but of the cojoint score".[19] By much 
the same argument one could maintain that if two per-
formances of the same score are combined, we have not 
two performances of the original work and score but 
rather a performance of a new work composed of the com-
bination of these two performances and compliant with a 
new, different score composed of the original score 
taken twice. For Goodman a compound character which 
contains other characters is nevertheless different and 
disjoint from the characters it contains, and thus the 
new score and the work it defines are different and 
disjoint from their components. 
Similarly, the literary work of art as a superin-
dividual composed of the sum of all inscriptions and 
utterances of the text would be a new compound 
character, a new text, different and disjoint from any 
of the unabridged copies of the original text. If the 
literary work of art is this 'super-compound' character 
or text, then what we usually call a complete, una-
bridged copy or utterance of the text is only a minute 
fraction of this super-compound text that constitutes 
the work, and the value of this fraction will constant-
ly grow smaller with each additional unabridged in-
scription or utterance. And if this is the case, one 
must ask how an utterance or inscription which is only 
a minute and constantly more minute fraction of the 
work of art can nevertheless be a fully authentic in-
stance of the work. 
Perhaps Goodman is ingenious enough to supply an-
swers to all these troubling questions arising from 
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this nominalistic translation of his theory, or better 
yet provide a clear and convincing nominalistic for-
mulation of his own. However, such a formulation is 
strikingly lacking and not even adumbrated in Languages 
of Art, nor can it be found in Goodman's more recent 
publications in aesthetics.[20] 
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